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Over the past decade, public assistance caseloads have increased 
rapidly to a historical high point and then decreased with even greater 
speed to their lowest level in decades. Several recent papers have 
focused on the rise in Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) caseloads in the early 1990s and the turn around in the mid 
1990s. This research indicates that both macroeconomic factors and 
program factors appear to be important for these changes. A key ques 
tion is whether these recent declines are permanent and how much they 
might turn around in a more sluggish economy. This paper is focused 
on the relationship between recent caseload changes and the overall 
economy, comparing estimates from a wide variety of models using 
both annual and monthly data. By using monthly data, which is avail 
able through late 1998, we also present several rough estimates of the 
impact of welfare reform after 1996.
The Food Stamp program has also experienced major program 
changes, although it has remained relatively unchanged for single 
mothers and their children who once participated in AFDC. This paper 
also provides a detailed comparative analysis of AFDC/TANF caseload 
changes with food stamp caseload changes.
The welfare reform legislation of 1996 has been cited as a primary 
reason why AFDC/TANF caseloads began a steep decline in the mid 
1990s. This legislation, which states were required by law to imple 
ment by July 1997, abolished the AFDC program and replaced it with 
the TANF block grant, giving states much greater discretion over the
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design of cash assistance and related work programs for low-income 
families. The extent of change in state public assistance programs fol 
lowing this legislation has been enormous. Virtually all states have 
implemented major changes in the way in which they determine eligi 
bility, require and support work effort, and organize their public assis 
tance offices. 1
These program changes occurred in a very strong labor market. At 
the end of 1998, the unemployment rate was at a 30-year low. Among 
workers who lacked a high school diploma, unemployment was near 7 
percent, after being in the double digits for years. This has led many 
observers to suggest that program reform may be less important to the 
decline in caseloads than many states are claiming. The widespread 
availability of jobs should have produced a steep decline in caseloads 
even in the absence of program changes. The question of how much 
caseload decline can be explained by economic factors is particularly 
important in forecasting future caseload changes. If the decline is 
largely due to tight labor markets, it may be more reversible in a future 
economic downturn than if the decline is due to tightened eligibility 
rules or greater "diversion" activities (keeping people off public assis 
tance by providing one-time assistance or requiring participation in job 
search activities).
Figure 1 shows AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads from 1980 
through 1998. Note that food stamp caseloads are consistently about 
twice as high as AFDC/TANF caseloads. 2 This reflects the broader eli 
gibility rules in the Food Stamp program. The unusual trends in the 
past decade are clearly apparent in this figure. AFDC caseloads, which 
were largely flat from the mid 1970s through 1990, rose by 27 percent 
between 1990 and 1994, but between 1994 and mid 1998 they fell by 
40 percent. In June of 1998, they were at their lowest level since 1972.
Food stamp caseloads follow a remarkably similar trend. They 
decline slightly faster than AFDC caseloads in the mid 1990s, in part 
because the legislation that abolished AFDC also cut access to food 
stamps among a number of immigrant groups and limited their avail 
ability to families without children. But they have continued to decline 
even after the implementation of these changes.
The rapidity of these changes is almost unprecedented. Indeed, the 
caseload increases of the early 1990s were one reason behind growing 
support for welfare reform. In turn, the caseload declines that have
Figure 1 AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Caseloads
1980 81 96 97 98
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occurred since the enactment of welfare reform have been unexpect 
edly large in the opinion of most observers. Many of the new state- 
designed programs funded under the TANF block grant involve time 
limits and extensive sanctioning policies, as well as efforts at diversion, 
all of which might be expected to cause caseload declines. These pro 
gram changes, however, lead to an important caveat: estimates that use 
historical evidence on the AFDC program to predict future changes in 
TANF-funded programs are probably unreliable. This is particularly 
true with regard to macroeconomic effects. As more persons reach 
time limits or are sanctioned, or as state dollars are more limited, peo 
ple may be less able to return to the rolls in an economic downturn. 
The long-term effect of current program changes on the responsiveness 
of caseloads to a future economic slowdown is hard to foresee with any 
certainty, although this is a key policy concern.
EXISTING RESEARCH ON CASELOAD CHANGE
Several recent studies have investigated the determinants underly 
ing the caseload changes in AFDC. A host of early studies focus on 
state-specific data or on data from only a few years. 3 More recent stud 
ies have used panel data on caseloads across many years. This includes 
work by the Council of Economic Advisers (1997), Blank (1997b), Zil- 
iak et al. (1998), and Levine and Whitmore (1998). Table 1 provides a 
brief comparison of this research. Except for the Blank study, these 
papers have focused almost entirely on the effect of economic variables 
and of program-related variables on caseloads. The Blank study went 
further in trying to utilize a host of demographic and political variables, 
although these appear to make little difference in her results on the 
impact of the economy or of programs. Blank's was also the only 
study to differentiate between the AFDC-Basic program for single par 
ents and the AFDC-UP (unemployed parents) program, a much more 
limited program for married-couple families. 4
One topic of concern in these studies is to understand the effect of 
AFDC "waivers," which allowed states to run experimental welfare 
programs prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation. These waivers 
differed greatly across states, but typically included some combination
Table 1 Major Research on Caseload Change
Study Data Dependent variable Included variables Results on key variables
Blank 
(1997b)
Annual state panel 
1977-95
Monthly state panel 
1977-96
ln(AFDC caseloads female 
pop. ages 15-44) 
(Also separates this into 
AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP 
caseloads)
VAR model using ln(AFDC 
caseloads) and 
unemployment rates as co- 










Estimated share of caseload 
change due to economic 
factors:
• 23% in 1990-94
•51% in 1994-95
One-point rise in 
unemployment leads to
• 3.5% in AFDC-Basic
•20% rise in AFDC-UP over 
an 18-month period











Estimated caseload change 
due to economic factors:
•24-31% in 1989-93
•31-45% m 1993-96
4.1% estimated change in 
AFDC caseloads due to 
1-pt. increase in 
unemployment.




Study Data Dependent variable Included variables Results on key variables
Levme & Whitmore 
(1998)
Same as CEA study Same as CEA study Same as CEA study, with 
more detailed data on 
waivers
Economic effects of same
size as CEA study. 





Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, 
& Connolly 
(1998)






4.1% estimated change in 
AFDC caseloads due to 
1-pt. increase in 
unemployment.
-9.1% change due to
Monthly state panel 
1987-96
Same as CEA study Same as above No separate estimates of 
economic effects alone. In 
26 states with the largest 
caseload reduction, 78% of 
change due to economic and 
seasonal factors, 1993-96.
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of time limits, expanded work requirements, expanded earnings disre 
gards, strengthened sanctions, and family caps (limiting AFDC bene 
fits to women who have additional children while receiving AFDC). 5
Most of these waivers were approved in 1994 or later; following 
the 1996 legislation, many states with major waivers developed TANF- 
funded programs that were similar to their waiver programs. States 
without waivers often looked to the states with waivers for ideas about 
how to restructure their programs. This suggests that estimates of the 
impact of these waivers on caseload changes might provide a minimal 
estimate of the expected effect of welfare reform. We return to this 
issue below.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the research using annual panel data by 
state and year produces reasonably consistent results. A 1-point 
increase in the unemployment rate appears to produce about a 4 per 
cent increase in the AFDC caseload share, while the implementation of 
a waiver program produced a 5-10 percent decline in caseload share. 
The economic cycle variables appear to explain about one quarter to 
one-third of the total caseload change in the early 1990s. In contrast, 
Ziliak et al. utilized monthly data on caseloads and unemployment 
rates and found far larger effects for the macroeconomy and smaller 
effects for program variables. It is difficult to make direct comparisons 
between their monthly data results and the other studies; this is one 
reason we estimate both annual and monthly models below. The dif 
ference appears to be primarily due to the difference in specifications 
and in how the results are reported. 6
The general conclusion from this research is that a host of vari 
ables appeared to influence caseload changes through the mid 1990s. 
While the macroeconomy was important, there is evidence that pro 
gram changes also had a substantial impact, particularly in states which 
implemented early waivers. The size and the interpretation of the 
effect of waiver implementation remain controversial. The increase in 
caseloads in the early 1990s is only poorly explained in these equa 
tions; neither the macroeconomy nor program changes justify the 
increase that occurred.
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WHY FOOD STAMP CASELOADS ARE ALSO INTERESTING
So far as we know, there has been no equivalent analysis of food 
stamp caseloads to date. This is perhaps surprising, since food stamps 
have historically been as large a program as AFDC in terms of total 
expenditures. From a budget perspective, large changes in food stamp 
caseloads are nearly as costly as large changes in AFDC caseloads, 
although the states do not bear the cost of food stamps. 7
Food stamps have historically served a broader population than 
AFDC and have been available to all low-income persons regardless of 
family composition, including the elderly as well as younger childless 
individuals and couples. Hence, a substantial share of the food stamp 
population does not receive AFDC. 8 On the other hand, most AFDC 
recipients are food stamp recipients. This share of the food stamp 
caseload should move in very similar ways to the AFDC caseload, 9 but 
other food stamp recipients may be less affected by program changes 
directed at the single-parent AFDC population and may respond differ 
ently to changes in the economic environment as well. Some of these 
other food stamp recipients are elderly and may be quite unresponsive 
to macroeconomic fluctuations, while others are single individuals or 
childless couples who might respond more strongly to changes in eco 
nomic opportunities than single mothers.
The Food Stamp program also experienced major program 
changes in the mid 1990s. A one-time reduction in food stamp eligibil 
ity occurred as a result of the 1996 legislation, when most immigrants 
were removed from the rolls. 10 In addition, for many areas of the coun 
try, childless individuals or families were time-limited in their receipt 
of food stamps. For most single-parent families—the group that his 
torically received both AFDC and food stamps—little changed in the 
Food Stamp program, but food stamp receipt has historically been 
closely linked to AFDC receipt, and the major changes in AFDC/ 
TANF programs will affect food stamp eligibility. For instance, if wel 
fare-to-work programs move most people into intermittent or very- 
low-wage jobs, they are likely to retain their food stamp eligibility. On 
the other hand, if these programs move families out of poverty, then 
food stamp caseloads will fall with TANF caseloads.
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As Figure 1 illustrated, food stamp caseloads and AFDC/TANF 
caseloads have moved in similar ways. This is somewhat surprising. 
One might have expected the economic expansion that started in 1991 
would have affected food stamp caseloads sooner than AFDC. Simi 
larly, because food stamp eligibility was not as affected by waivers and 
state reform efforts in the mid 1990s, one might not have expected 
ongoing food stamp caseload declines once food stamp eligibility 
changes were implemented in 1997.
The close historical correlation between food stamp and AFDC 
caseload changes suggests that the behavioral and program changes 
driving AFDC recipiency also affect food stamp recipiency. In this 
case, the biggest uncertainty in the future evolution of the food stamp 
program may be whether the transformation from AFDC to TANF will 
fundamentally change who does or doesn't use food stamps. Histori 
cally, AFDC recipients were categorically eligible for food stamps and 
most states had combined eligibility determination procedures. With 
the implementation of time limits and restricted eligibility in many 
state TANF-funded programs, the number of food stamp eligibles who 
also receive TANF is likely to fall. Whether or not this expected reduc 
tion in the TANF-eligible food stamp population results in a fall in 
food stamp caseloads depends on whether individuals know about their 
continuing food stamp eligibility. 11 Whether food stamp receipt will 
remain as closely linked to TANF receipt as it was to AFDC receipt 
remains to be seen.
ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BOTH 
AFDC/TANF AND FOOD STAMP CASELOADS
In this section, we provide comparative estimates of the determi 
nants of both AFDC and food stamp caseloads based on annual panel 
data. Table 2 presents a set of regression estimates of the determinants 
of AFDC total caseloads based on three different specifications (col 
umns 1 to 3) and compares these with caseload determinants for sev 
eral food stamp caseload specifications (columns 4 to 6). Annual panel 
data on caseloads by state and year are used from 1980 through 1996.
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a Dependent variable is ln(caseloads/total population). All regressions based on data for 49 states and D.C. from 1980-96. (Data on food 
stamps in Vermont are not available for this time period. For consistency we drop this state in the AFDC estimates as well.) Standard 
errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; * at the 5 percent level.
b Specification includes unemployment rate + program variables + state and year effects.
c Specification is that of Col. 1 + control variables (see pp. 62-63).
d Specification is that of Col. 2 + state specific time trends.
e Specification is that of Col. 2.
f Dependent variable is residual food stamp cases, which equals food stamp caseloads minus estimated AFDC recipients who also receive 
food stamps (see p. 64).
g Specification is Col. 4 + AFDC caseload control.
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The dependent variable is the ln(share of caseloads), with caseloads in 
each state and year divided by total state population.
The models in Table 2 include fixed effects for each state and for 
each year. This allows each state to have a different constant level of 
caseloads and controls for any omitted variables in the specification 
that might be largely constant within states over time. This specifica 
tion essentially allows the coefficients to be interpreted as the effect of 
changes in the independent variables over time within a state on a 
state's caseload. We discuss below the impact of also including state- 
specific time trends in these models.
The first column presents a specification similar to that used by the 
CEA (1997), which is quite sparse and includes only unemployment 
rates and a few program variables. The results are estimated over a 
longer time period and include 1996, for which data were not available 
when the CEA report was produced. The second and third columns 
use a much richer specification, originally utilized by Blank (1997b). 
The independent variables include four sets of variables. 12 First, a set 
of economic-related variables are included. The unemployment rate 
(current, lagged one year, and lagged two years) is probably the best 
state-specific measure of economic cyclically. In addition, we have 
calculated the natural logarithms of median wages and of the 20th 
quintile of the wage distribution. 13
Second, a set of state demographic variables are included, consist 
ing of percent elderly, percent black, percent single-female headed 
families, percent non-marital births, average years of education, and 
percent immigrant. The immigrant share is defined as the number of 
newly admitted immigrants in a state divided by the state's total popu 
lation. The immigrant share is lagged by one and two years to allow 
time for increases in immigration to affect public assistance caseloads. 
Third, a set of political variables are included, based on the political 
affiliation of the governor, whether both state legislative houses are 
Republican, and whether both state legislative houses are Democratic.
Finally, we include program-related variables. AFDC benefit lev 
els measure the maximum cash support available to a four-person fam 
ily in the state. A dummy variable for the presence of an AFDC-UP 
program is included where appropriate. We also include a variable for 
the share of the year in which a state has a major program waiver 
approved for implementation in the post-1991 period. 14 As noted
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above, these waivers allowed states to implement major variations to 
the AFDC program and were precursors to the TANF-funded programs 
that flourished after welfare reform.
The coefficients in columns 1 through 3 provide an indication of 
how AFDC caseloads respond to these variables, particularly the eco 
nomic and program variables. Column 1 shows results for a model that 
includes only unemployment rates and program variables, i.e., those 
variables which often receive the most attention from policymakers. 
Although the estimating period and the specification are slightly differ 
ent, the results are very similar to those reported by the CEA (1997). 
Unemployment has a strong relationship to caseloads, although much 
of this effect occurs only over time. Three years after a 1-point rise in 
the unemployment rate, caseloads will have risen by 6.4 percent. Pro 
gram variables also have strong effects. States that raise their AFDC 
maximum benefits levels experience a rise in caseloads; states that 
implemented waivers experienced a decline in caseloads, all else equal.
As earlier researchers indicated, interpreting this waiver coefficient 
is difficult. These effects are almost surely more than just the direct 
program effects of the waivers; they probably also include "demonstra 
tion effects," whereby individuals who were actually unaffected by the 
waivers nonetheless changed their behavior because of the strong mes 
sage states were trying to send that they were going to "get tough" on 
welfare recipients. Evidence of this is in Blank (1997b), who showed 
that states with waivers actually saw significant declines in their case 
load in the year before the waiver was granted.
Even with state fixed effects included, one might worry that the 
model in column 1 excludes a large number of variables that might rea 
sonably affect caseloads within a state over time. Column 2 provides a 
much richer specification. The most striking result in column 2 is that 
the impact of unemployment and of program variables is quite similar, 
even when a very rich set of other control variables is included in the 
model. Although the timing of the unemployment effect is somewhat 
different in column 2, a 1-point rise in unemployment results in a 6.0 
percent rise in caseloads over a three-year period, very similar to col 
umn 1. The coefficients on AFDC benefit levels and waivers are virtu 
ally identical between the two columns; this is true even though the 
additional variables in column 2 are collectively quite important in 
explaining caseload changes over time.
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Changes in median wages, in non-marital birth rates, in years of 
education, and in percent elderly are all important in determining state 
caseload changes. With regard to state political variables, Republican 
governors appear to negatively affect AFDC caseloads. There is an 
additional negative effect on AFDC caseloads if both state legislative 
branches are controlled by Republicans. The magnitude and signifi 
cance of these political effects indicate that even prior to TANF, states 
could affect caseloads, probably through their organization of public 
assistance offices and the messages which case workers were in 
structed to deliver to clients. But these variables must be largely 
uncorrelated with the unemployment and program variables in column
1. since their inclusion has little affect on those coefficients.
Column 3 includes state-specific time trends, in addition to state 
and year effects. On the one hand, this controls more fully for omitted 
variables within states that might be trending up or down over time. 
On the other hand, the effect of the included variables that are validly 
correlated with caseload changes may be reduced by the inclusion of 
state-specific time trends if those variables also trend up or down grad 
ually over time. Our own preference is for the specification in column
2. which does not include these state-specific time trends that we think 
may overcontrol for omitted variables, but the results in column 3 pro 
vide a comparison for those who prefer to include state-specific trends.
Column 3 indicates that including controls for state-specific time 
trends reduces the magnitude of most coefficients, as expected. Yet, 
almost all of the same variables are significant in columns 2 and 3, and 
the general conclusions about what drives caseload changes over time 
within states would be similar regardless of the specification. In col 
umn 3, a 1-percentage-point rise in unemployment results in a 4.7 per 
cent increase in caseloads over a three-year period. We interpret 
column 3 as indicating that state-specific time trends do not change 
most of the larger conclusions about the determinants of caseloads.
Because we prefer the specification in column 2, we use that speci 
fication in analyzing the food stamp data in columns 4 through 6. We 
have repeated the food stamp regressions with state-specific time 
trends included, and the results are similar to those seen in comparing 
columns 2 and 3 (data not shown).
Column 4 estimates total food stamp caseloads using a specifica 
tion identical to column 2. Ideally, given the very diverse populations
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on food stamps, one would like to look at single-parent food stamp 
recipients separately from other recipients, just as one might separate 
AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP recipients. Unfortunately, there are no 
data available which provide regular information on food stamp receipt 
by family composition by state. Hence, we try two different ap 
proaches in order to separate the AFDC population from the rest of the 
food stamp recipients.
First, we attempt to net out the AFDC population from food stamp 
caseloads. In each year, we know nationally how many AFDC recipi 
ents also receive food stamps. 15 We take this share and multiply it by 
the number of AFDC recipients in each state and subtract this from the 
food stamp caseloads. This should leave us with a dependent variable 
that provides an estimate of non-AFDC food stamp recipients, which 
we refer to as "residual food stamp cases." This number is used as the 
dependent variable in column 5. Note that this dependent variable is 
measured with error; in general, measurement error in the dependent 
variable will not bias the estimates, but it will increase the standard 
errors.
Our second effort to net out the effect of AFDC is seen in column 
6, where we include AFDC caseloads as a control variable in the 
regression for total food stamp caseloads. Since food stamp and AFDC 
recipiency are often jointly determined, there are some endogeneity 
problems with this approach. Thus, we prefer the estimates in column 
5, but we provide the estimates in column 6 as a comparison.
Begin by comparing the determinants of food stamp caseloads in 
column 4 to the AFDC caseload estimates in columns 1 through 3. 
Food stamps are more responsive to the unemployment rate than 
AFDC. A 1-point rise in the unemployment rate will increase the food 
stamp caseload by 6.8 percent over a three-year period. 16 Like AFDC, 
food stamp caseloads are also responsive to median wage levels in the 
state. Food stamps also appear to be more responsive to demographic 
factors than AFDC. The percent black, the percent single female heads 
of household, and the percent of nonmarital births significantly 
increase food stamp caseloads, while years of education and the per 
cent elderly decrease food stamp caseloads.
The political variables have very similar effects on both AFDC and 
food stamp caseloads. This is unexpected, since there are no avenues 
by which states can directly affect food stamp eligibility and payment
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rules through state legislation or regulations. However, to the extent 
that AFDC and food stamp recipiency are jointly determined, discour 
aging AFDC participation may also discourage food stamp participa 
tion. This historical evidence of a tight link between food stamp 
caseloads and variables that can only affect food stamps through 
AFDC receipt is consistent with more recent stories which suggest that 
current food stamp caseloads are being affected by women leaving the 
TANF program.
AFDC benefit levels are not highly correlated with food stamp 
caseloads, although the presence of an AFDC-UP program does cause 
higher food stamp caseloads, perhaps because it provides easy access 
to food stamps for the AFDC-UP population. The implementation of 
waivers appears to have a negative effect on food stamps, although 
smaller than their effect on AFDC. This result further suggests that 
food stamp participation is linked to AFDC utilization, since few of 
these waivers involved changes to food stamp rules, per se. Food 
stamp recipients may also experience some of the same demonstration 
effects as AFDC recipients, hearing the message about "getting tough" 
on welfare recipients without clearly distinguishing that it does not 
apply to the Food Stamp program.
Comparing columns 4 and 5, column 5 provides an (admittedly 
imprecise) measure of food stamp usage among non-AFDC recipients. 
We see somewhat stronger responsiveness to unemployment in column 
5. A 1-point rise in unemployment results in an 8.5 percent rise in 
residual food stamp caseloads over three years. The coefficients on 
wages and on demographic effects are generally similar to those for 
total food stamp caseloads.
The determinants of residual food stamp usage show strong policy 
responsiveness. The presence of a major waiver increases the non- 
AFDC food stamp population, while the increases in the level of 
AFDC benefits decrease the non-AFDC food stamp population. The 
sign of the effect of a major waiver and AFDC benefit levels on resid 
ual food stamp caseloads is consistent with the hypothesis that the peo 
ple who are pushed off AFDC because of waiver implementation or 
falling real benefit levels remain in low-wage employment, thus, 
retaining their food stamp eligibility. Hence, higher AFDC benefits 
result in fewer non-AFDC food stamp cases, and waivers (which
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reduce the AFDC caseload) result in more non-AFDC food stamp 
cases.
There are some difficulties in the interpretation of column 6, which 
includes AFDC caseloads as an independent variable explaining food 
stamp caseloads, because of the endogeneity between AFDC caseloads 
and food stamp caseloads. AFDC caseloads are highly correlated with 
food stamp caseloads, and once AFDC caseloads are included in the 
food stamp regression, other variables generally become much less sig 
nificant.
In general, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that food stamp case 
loads have been quite closely tied to AFDC caseloads, and AFDC pro 
gram variables affect food stamp receipt. The determinants of food 
stamp caseloads appear quite similar to the determinants of AFDC 
caseloads, although food stamp caseloads are somewhat more cyclical 
and more affected by a range of demographic characteristics.
HOW WELL DO THESE ESTIMATES EXPLAIN BOTH THE 
RISE AND FALL OF CASELOADS?
The sharp rise and fall in caseloads in the 1990s raises the question 
of how well these estimates are explaining this pattern. At some level, 
it would be very surprising if they fully explained these changes; such 
dramatic changes in program utilization are rarely well explained by 
smoothly changing economic or demographic variables.
Figure 2 provides a sense of how (in)effectively the rise and fall in 
caseloads is explained by the control variables in Table 2. The figure 
shows the value of the year fixed effects from 1985 through 1996 (with 
1985 normalized to 0) for AFDC and food stamp caseload shares (col 
umns 2 and 4 in Table 2). These fixed effects measure the unexplained 
caseload level in that year (relative to 1985), after the effects of the 
included variables on caseloads are taken into account. If the regres 
sions fully explain all the variation in the data, the year effects should 
be zero in all years. If, however, there is a rise or fall in the dependent 
variable over time which the included variables do not account for, 
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Figure 2 suggests that there was a significant unexplained increase 
in both AFDC and food stamp caseloads during much of the period 
from 1985 to 1996. Interestingly, as Blank (1997b) indicated, this 
unexplained increase starts around 1985, although the actual caseload 
data is flat from 1985 to 1990. This increase in the year fixed effects 
after 1985 suggests that the included variables predict that caseloads 
should have fallen between 1985 and 1990; instead they remained con 
stant. From 1985 to 1989 unemployment fell, median wages rose, and 
AFDC benefits declined. All of these should have led to a decline in 
caseloads during these years, which did not occur. A mild recession in 
1990 and 1991 was followed by an economic expansion and changes in 
the political and policy environment that (by 1994) should have pro 
duced much lower caseloads than were realized. 17
Table 3 provides additional information on how well (or how 
poorly) these regressions predict actual caseload changes over these 
years. Columns 1 through 3 provide information on actual and pre 
dicted changes based on the annual panel data models for AFDC cases, 
food stamp cases, and residual food stamp cases. The table focuses on 
three periods: 1990-94, when caseloads were rising rapidly; 1994-96, 
the period for which we have a complete set of control variables and 
when caseloads began to fall; and 1994-98, the entire recent period of 
caseload decline (for which we have only limited information on other 
variables.)
Between 1990 and 1994, the In of AFDC-Total caseload share rose 
by 0.18 points (row 1, column 1), but our regression forecasts that it 
should have fallen by 0.02 points (row 2). In short, over this time period, 
the model has no predictive power at all; none of the caseload increase 
is explained. This does not mean that none of the variables have predic 
tive power, however. Changes in unemployment alone would have pre 
dicted 50.5 percent of the actual caseload rise (row 3), but these changes 
were offset by strong predicted falls due to movements in demographic 
and program variables. Although only a few states implemented waiv 
ers during this time period, these waivers by themselves would have 
caused a 13 percent decline in caseloads (row 4).
In contrast, the food stamp caseload share prediction (column 2) 
for 1990 and 1994 at least moves in the same direction as the actual 
caseload, but far under-predicts the actual rise that occurs. The regres 
sion predicts a 0.10-point increase, when in reality a 0.30-point
Table 3 Predicted versus Actual Changes in Public Assistance-Caseloads, and Share Explained 
by Economic Factors3
Models from monthly panel data
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a The actual and predicted change in each column are based on the ln(caseload share of the total population). 
b For 1994-98 rows, this column is AFDC/TANF caseload share.
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increase occurs. This suggests that two-thirds of the food stamp case 
load increases between these years is unexplained by the model. 
Changes in the unemployment rates alone would have predicted 34 
percent of the increase that actually occurred. Changes in residual 
food stamp caseloads are better explained by this model (recall that 
they are more affected by demographic and economic factors). Only 
25 percent (0.10/0.397) of the rise in residual food stamp caseloads is 
unexplained.
The model does not do quite so badly for the 1994-96 period when 
caseloads begin to decline. For both food stamps and AFDC, the 
regression predicts a larger decline than actually occurred. For AFDC, 
the regression predicts a 0.17-point decline in the caseload share; the 
actual decline was 0.15 points. Changes in the unemployment rate 
explain just under half of this decline. For food stamps, changes in 
unemployment explained 96 percent of the decline in total caseloads 
and predict a substantially larger decline for residual food stamps than 
actually occurred. The implementation of waivers in a growing num 
ber of states explain another 21 percent (17 percent) of the decline in 
AFDC (food stamps). This suggests that information on unemploy 
ment and waivers would explain 69 percent (112 percent) of the total 
decline in AFDC (food stamp) cases.
At the bottom of Table 3 we include information on TANF case 
loads and explore the decline in caseloads through mid 1998. Because 
we lack information on many of the explanatory variables in the annual 
data model for 1998, we cannot predict an aggregate 1998 caseload 
number; however, we do have actual information on unemployment, 
which we can use to predict the share of caseload change due to unem 
ployment alone. 18 The AFDC/TANF caseload share fell 0.62 points 
from 1994 through mid 1998, with particularly steep declines post- 
1996. The unemployment rate alone explained 19 percent of this 
decline, and 38 percent of the decline in food stamps. This suggests 
that the most recent and rapid decline in TANF and food stamp case 
loads is only partially explained by economic factors.
The results in Table 3 indicate three things. First, changes in case 
loads in the 1990s are only poorly explained by these regressions. 
None of the increase in AFDC and only a small share of the increase in 
food stamps in the early 1990s is predicted by these models. Second, if 
unemployment alone was used to predict caseload change, it would
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explain about half of the increase in caseloads in the early 1990s, but 
only about 20 percent of the decline in caseloads in the mid 1990s. 
The inability of economic factors to explain the dramatic fall in case 
loads after 1994 suggests that other factors have influenced participa 
tion in TANF-funded programs in recent years. This is consistent with 
the argument that welfare reform has caused changes in behavior 
among potential welfare recipients (more leave early or never enter) or 
is limiting the rolls (keeping people off or removing current recipients) 
through tighter sanctioning and eligibility requirements. Third, food 
stamp changes are better predicted by these models than AFDC 
changes. This is particularly true for residual food stamp cases where 
participation in food stamps is not tied to the AFDC program. Like 
AFDC, however, the majority of the change in total food stamp case 
loads is unexplained by economic factors through most of the recent 
time period.
CROSS-CHECKING THESE ESTIMATES WITH 
MONTHLY DATA
In this section, we use monthly data to examine the responsiveness 
of AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads to the monthly state unem 
ployment rate, early implementation of waivers, and program changes 
associated with the 1996 welfare reform legislation. These estimates 
serve two purposes. First, they provide an important robustness check 
of our estimates using annual caseload data. 19 Secondly, use of the 
monthly data allows us to analyze the caseload data after 1996. A 
major drawback of utilizing the annual panel data is that many of the 
dependent variables are only available through 1996, although the 
caseload data is available through June 1998 for AFDC/TANF and for 
food stamps.
With monthly data, we are forced to use a much sparser specifica 
tion: the only variable available monthly by state is the unemployment 
rate. This lack of data limits our ability to interpret the results. For 
instance, if states with more rapidly plummeting unemployment rates 
are also states that move faster and push harder on welfare reform, then 
we will pick up some program effects with the unemployment variable.
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Hence, these regressions provide an alternative estimate of the extent 
to which employment changes are driving caseloads, but it is probably 
a somewhat less reliable estimate than we were able to derive in Table 
2 with annual data. On the other hand, the addition of other variables 
to the model in Table 2 (compare columns 1 and 2) appeared to have 
only minor effects on the unemployment coefficients, and we take this 
as evidence that a sparser specification with monthly data may produce 
reasonably reliable results.
In addition to the unemployment rate, we include the waiver 
dummy variables described above, which "turn on" in states in the 
month when a waiver is approved for implementation, 20 and a dummy 
variable for welfare reform, which equals 1 in all months after Decem 
ber 1996. This latter variable will pick up any shift in the constant (in 
the models described below, this represents a shift in the rate of change 
in caseloads) after the passage of the welfare reform legislation in late 
1996. The coefficient on this dummy variable will describe the aver 
age unexplained caseload change in states post-1996 after controlling 
for unemployment and a host of state and month fixed effects.
There are several difficulties in dealing with the monthly caseload 
data: the data is highly seasonal; seasonal patterns vary significantly 
across states; and the data has a strong trend. Because each state's data 
is very different in terms of seasonal patterns and trend, it is difficult to 
estimate traditional panel data models. What is needed to obtain accu 
rate estimates from the monthly caseload data is an estimation proce 
dure that accounts for the different patterns of seasonality and trending 
between states, while throwing away as little information as possible. 
Figure 3 shows the monthly caseload data from three states: Alaska, 
California, and New York. The diversity of the monthly caseload data 
in terms of trend and seasonal patterns is apparent. The data from 
Alaska is highly seasonal and exhibits a strong upward trend over the 
sample range; the data from California exhibits a strong upward trend 
but is not very seasonal; and the data from New York exhibits neither a 
strong seasonal pattern nor an upward trend.
The usual way of dealing with seasonality in aggregate monthly 
data is to include month fixed effects in the set of regressors. Because 
the seasonal patterns in the caseload data are not consistent across 
states, this approach is not ideal. With one set of monthly dummy vari 
ables each state's caseloads will be adjusted with respect to the average
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state's seasonal pattern. This sort of adjustment is not a problem for 
states in which seasonal fluctuations are close to the average, but it is a 
problem for states in which the seasonal patterns are very different 
from the average. Take, for example, a state without a seasonal pattern 
in the caseload data (like New York in Figure 3). With one set of 
monthly dummy variables for all states, this state's caseloads will be 
adjusted up in months where the average state caseloads are low rela 
tive to the omitted month and will be adjusted down in months where 
the average state caseloads are high relative to the omitted month. The 
net effect of this seasonal adjustment for a state without a seasonal pat 
tern is to add meaningless seasonal variability to the data.
An alternative approach to dealing with seasonality in the 
monthly caseload data is to estimate models with state-specific month 
effects. Dealing with the problem of seasonality in this manner 
requires estimating 612 (51x12) separate state-month effects, but it 
avoids the problem of incorrectly assigning the same month effects to 
all of the states despite their differing seasonal patterns. It should be 
noted that state fixed effects are a linear combination of state-month 
effects, thus the inclusion of state-specific month effects implies that 
the resulting estimator will be directly comparable to the specifica 
tions in Table 2.
There are several plausible approaches to dealing with the trend in 
the monthly caseload data. The simplest approach to dealing with the 
problem of strongly trending caseload data (i.e., nonstationarity) is to 
estimate a model with period fixed effects (i.e., a separate fixed effect 
for each month of data). This is the approach taken with the annual 
data in the Table 2 regressions. The potential drawback of this 
approach is that the combination of period fixed effects and state fixed 
effects is perfectly collinear with state-month effects if there are more 
than 12 years of data. This perfect collinearity means that if state and 
period fixed effects are included in the set of regressors, state-month 
effects cannot be. Since the inclusion of state-month effects is impor 
tant for reasons described above, dealing with the problem of nonsta 
tionarity through the inclusion of period fixed effects is not ideal. 
Indeed, state-month effects provide a more flexible specification and 
constrain the data less than period fixed effects.
Another approach to this problem is to estimate models with state- 
specific time trends. Since much of the pattern in monthly state case-
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load data is composed of a strong upward trend and seasonal compo 
nents, detrending the caseload data may throw out too much variability 
in the data. This is similar to our argument against including state-spe 
cific time trends in Table 2.
We adopt a third approach to address the problem of trending 
dependent variables, by estimating all models in first-difference form. 
While this is not a perfect way to deal with the problem of non-station 
ary monthly caseload data, it is probably the best choice given the con 
straint that the data from all of the states must be treated in a like 
manner. This approach does seem to produce stationary time series for 
most of the states and is probably better than the alternatives of 
detrending or estimating a model with period fixed effects. 21
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to choice of specifi 
cation we estimate models with and without a lagged dependent vari 
able and investigate the effects of different lag lengths within each 
model. Assume that In caseloads in state i during period t are gener 
ated by the process
Eq-1 ln(c|f ,)= I
7 = 0 
12
+ I «"/,* + £/,, 
k= 1
where
q = lag length
ult = the state monthly unemployment rate
wl>t = a binary variable indicating whether a state has a waiver in 
effect
rlt = the welfare reform binary variable that equals 1 after Jan 
uary of 1997
smlk = the month effect associated with state / during month k
elt = a random, mean zero error term.
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Taking first differences and rearranging terms yields the following 
Eq.2 to(c) = $&u
12
q q i 
where P = Z P •, 7 = X 7,» and r| = £ -n.. Note that p, 7, and
7 = 0 ; = 0 ; = 0
r| represent the long-run effects of the unemployment rate, waivers,
and the recent welfare reform legislation on caseloads. Also note that
this model allows for exogenous caseload growth as long as
12
y Asm- , is greater than zero. This offers some control for steady
I, K
k= 1
caseload growth due to changes in omitted variables such as demo 
graphic or political factors.
The first two columns of Table 4 present the estimates of the long- 
run effects of the unemployment rate, waiver implementation, and wel 
fare reform on AFDC/TANF caseloads (part A) and food stamp case 
loads (part B) with the lag length (q) set to 12 and 24 months, 
respectively.22 The estimates of the long-run effect of unemployment 
from the monthly model with the lag length set to 24 months are 
remarkably similar to the estimates from the annual data. The esti 
mates from the model with 24 monthly lags indicate that a one-point 
rise in the state unemployment rate will cause a 4 percent increase in 
AFDC/TANF caseloads. This estimate of the impact of the unemploy 
ment rate on AFDC caseloads is close to the 6 percent increase in case 
loads associated with a one-point increase in the unemployment rate 
estimated using the annual data model. 23 For food stamp caseloads, the 
monthly model with 24 monthly lags and the annual data model both 
imply that the long-run effect of a one-point increase in the state unem 
ployment rate is about a 6 percent increase in caseloads.
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Table 4 Estimates of the Long-Run Determinants of AFDC/TANF and 
Food Stamp Caseloads by Model Specification
No lagged With lagged 
dependent variable dependent variable
Long-run effect of 12 lags 24 lags 12 lags 24 lags

































a Dummy variable equal to 1 from first quarter 1997 onward. 
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
The estimated long-run effect of waivers implied by the monthly 
data model with a lag length of 24 months is almost twice as high as 
the estimate generated with the annual data models. This result is not 
surprising considering that many of the waivers were not implemented 
until 1995 and 1996. If caseloads take time to adjust to the implemen 
tation of a waiver, the full effect of the waivers will not be realized 
until after 1996. Because the annual data only runs through 1996, it is 
doubtful that the specifications using annual data will pick up the full 
effect of the waiver.
The estimated effect of welfare reform (the post-96 dummy vari 
able) is very large in this model, although interpreting this coefficient 
in any programmatic way is difficult. The model suggests that case 
loads were 28 to 35 percent lower following the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation, all else equal. It is not possible to conclude anything about 
how much of this effect is due to program eligibility changes, behavior 
changes by clients and caseworkers, or other factors occurring at the 
same time. At best, this provides a maximal estimate of the impact of 
welfare reform on caseloads over this time period.
One assumption of the distributed lag models estimated in Table 4 
is that the adjustment period to shocks in unemployment or implemen-
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tation of waivers is limited to the length of the lag in the model. It is 
useful to see how the estimated long-run effects change when this 
restriction is lifted. The restriction that the adjustment period is limited 
to the lag length can be lifted by allowing for lagged values of the 
dependent variable to enter into the right-hand side of eq. 1. Modify 
ing eq. 1 to include lagged values of the dependent variable yields the 
following equation:






Taking first differences and rearranging terms, 
Eq.4 Aln(C(.,)- Aln(C,.,_9 ) = -a- A.n(C. f_ f_
q+ 1
j=Q i,t-q
+T1 .1 Ar. . . - Ar. . I V\ i,t-J i,t-q)
12
Z Asm. , + Ae. 
k=l ' '
where a = 1 - X ay, (3 = £ py, y = I y;-, and T| = X r^..
7-1 7-0 7=0 7=0 
The long-run effects of the state unemployment rate, implementation 
of waivers, and the recent welfare reform legislation on caseloads are 
given by p/a, y/a, and Tj/a.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the estimated long-run effects 
of the unemployment rate, waivers, and welfare reform on AFDC/ 
TANF and food stamp caseloads for lag lengths of 12 and 24 months in 
models with a lagged dependent variable. These estimates are quite 
similar to the estimates in columns 1 and 2, which are without the 
lagged dependent variable. The models that allow for lags of 12 
months imply slightly lower estimates of long-run effects of the unem 
ployment rate, waivers, and welfare reform than the models that allow 
lags of 24 months. While the estimated effects of the state unemploy 
ment rate from the model with 12 lags are lower than those estimated 
from the annual data, the estimated effect of the state unemployment 
rate from the model that allows for 24 lags are very close to the esti 
mates from the annual data. As in columns 1 and 2, with an additional 
two and one-half years of data the estimated long run effects of waiver 
implementation are higher than those implied by the annual data.
Columns 4 though 7 in Table 3 present the predicted versus actual 
changes from the monthly data. 24 Columns 4 and 5 show the estimates 
for AFDC/TANF and for food stamps based on the model with 24 lags 
and no lagged dependent variable; columns 6 and 7 provide the same 
figures for the model with 12 lags and a lagged dependent variable. 
There is no good way to determine which of these models and what lag 
length to use. We show these two specifications to provide a range of 
estimates. The fact that both of these models produce relatively similar 
results suggests that the results are robust to these specification 
choices.
As with the annual data, the models which utilize the monthly data 
do not do a satisfactory job of predicting the changes in caseloads 
between 1990-94, 1994-96 and 1994-98. The models without lagged 
dependent variables account for 14 percent of the growth in log AFDC/ 
TANF caseloads between 1990 and 1994 and about 19 percent of the 
growth in log food stamp caseloads over the same time period. The 
models which allow for lagged values of the dependent variables do a 
better job of accounting for the growth in both AFDC/TANF and food 
stamp caseloads between 1990 and 1994, explaining 33 percent and 22 
percent of the increases in AFDC/TANF and food stamp cases, respec 
tively. The fact that the monthly data models do a better job than the 
annual data models in predicting the caseload increases between 1990 
and 1994 is due to the absence of a full set of demographic, economic,
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and program factors in the monthly specifications; as discussed above, 
many of these variables suggest caseloads should be declining over this 
period, not rising. 25 While the monthly models do a better job than the 
annual models of predicting the change in both AFDC/TANF and food 
stamp caseloads between 1990 and 1994, they imply a smaller percent 
age of the increase in caseloads can be attributed to changes in eco 
nomic factors. 26
Our greatest interest is in how the monthly models handle the case 
load decline between 1994-98, a period over which we could not effec 
tively make predictions from the annual models because many of the 
included variables were unavailable past 1996. The monthly models 
predict a high share of the fall in caseloads between 1994 and 1998. 
These "predictive" models include, however, the dummy variable for 
welfare reform post 1996. A better measure of the predictive power of 
the monthly models is the share of the caseload decline that would 
have been forecast by the changes in unemployment alone. For 1994- 
98, unemployment changes would have forecast between 8 and 12 per 
cent of the AFDC/TANF caseload decline and between 27 and 41 per 
cent of the food stamp decline. These figures are reasonably consistent 
with the prediction from the annual data.
The results in Table 3 for both monthly and annual panel data sug 
gest that economic factors explain only a small share of the changes in 
AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads, (although the models do a 
somewhat better job of explaining food stamp caseload changes than 
AFDC/TANF caseload changes). This is true both for the rise in case 
loads from 1990-94 and for the fall in caseloads from 1994-98.
The results presented in Table 4 show only a small subset of possi 
ble specifications available for obtaining estimates of the effect of 
employment and program changes on caseloads using monthly data. 
Because the models presented in Table 4 deal with the problems of sea- 
sonality and trending in what we think is the most reasonable way, they 
provide what is—in our opinion—the best approach to estimating 
these relationships. It is, however, important to note that alternative 
specifications provide different estimates of the impact of employment 
and program changes on AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads. In 
particular, Ziliak and Figlio (1999) come to very different conclusions 
about the relative impact of employment and waiver implementation
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on AFDC caseloads using monthly data and estimate much smaller 
effects of waivers.
Their preferred model for estimating monthly AFDC caseloads 
differs from the models estimated in this section in several ways. First, 
their specification does not contain any lags of the waiver variable. 
Instead, they include a contemporaneous waiver effect as well as a 
binary variable which, in a first-differenced model, is equal to 1 for all 
months between waiver approval and waiver implementation in their 
set of exogenous variables. Secondly, their model incorporates a 
slightly different lag structure. 27 Thirdly, they estimate their models 
with state fixed effects and month fixed effects, while we employ state- 
month effects. Fourth, they include a national quadratic trend to adjust 
for long-run changes in national factors such as the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit or shifting demographic and political fac 
tors. This section would be incomplete without a few comments about 
which of the differences between these models are responsible for the 
differences in results.
We do not have data on the time between waiver approval and 
waiver implementation, so we can not directly test the importance of 
including this variable. We can, however, perform an ad hoc analysis 
of this issue. If all states have the same time between waiver approval 
and waiver implementation, then the combination of a contemporane 
ous waiver effect along with this implementation lag variable is equiv 
alent to restricting the lagged waiver coefficients in our specifications, 
where the waiver lag length is the number of months between waiver 
approval and waiver implementation. For example, suppose all states 
that approved a waiver for implementation waited 18 months before 
they actually implemented that waiver. Then, in a first-difference 
model of monthly caseloads, having a contemporaneous waiver effect, 
and a waiver implementation lag is the same as having a contempora 
neous waiver effect and 18 lags of the, waiver effect, with the coeffi 
cient on all 18 of the lags constrained to be the same. In the case where 
all states implement waivers at the same speed, we can test how impor 
tant Ziliak and Figlio's restriction on the lagged waiver effects are in 
explaining the differences between their results and the results pre 
sented in this paper. It turns out the restrictions implied by their 
approach under the scenario where all states are the same do not make
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a measurable difference in assessing the long-run effects of the unem 
ployment rate and waivers on AFDC caseloads.
How much of the difference between the results in Ziliak and 
Figlio is attributable to differing lag structures? The answer seems to 
be not very much. Estimating specifications equivalent to theirs but 
with our lag structure leads to surprisingly similar results. We do esti 
mate slightly higher long-run effects of unemployment and waiver 
implementation, but the differences are small. Surprisingly, another 
difference that does not matter very much is the treatment of seasonal- 
ity. Whether state fixed effects and month fixed effects or state-month 
effects are used makes very little difference in the estimated long-run 
effects of the unemployment rate and waiver implementation in the 
first-differenced caseload models.
The major factor in explaining the differences between Ziliak and 
Figlio's results and ours is that they include a quadratic time trend in 
their specifications, while we do not. When we include the quadratic 
time trend in our specifications, the long-run effect of unemployment 
remains virtually unchanged while the long-run effect of waiver imple 
mentation decreases by over half. This result is robust across all of the 
Table 4 specifications. What inferences are drawn about the magnitude 
of the effect of waiver implementation on caseloads hinges on whether 
you believe including a quadratic trend in models like the ones 
described in this section is appropriate.
We argue against including quadratic time trends in these specifi 
cations. For most states, the trend in the monthly caseload data is 
removed by first-differencing. After seasonally adjusting this differ 
enced monthly caseload data, we believe that most (if not all) of the 
remaining variability in the data is meaningful and we should let it 
identify the parameters of interest. A simple look at Figure 1 will indi 
cate why a quadratic term is highly significant, but this movement is 
exactly what we want to explain with the dependent variables. In our 
view including a quadratic time trend over adjusts the data and mis 
estimates the actual effects of program changes over time.
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CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the determinants of caseloads for both the 
AFDC and Food Stamp program, with particular attention to the role 
played by the macroeconomy. The results suggest that recent changes 
in caseloads appear to be due to a multitude of factors, many of them 
not readily measurable even with a very rich specification including 
economic, demographic, political, and policy-related variables. 
Although many of these factors are clearly correlated with caseload 
changes within states over time, they do not explain the recent trends 
well. The fact that the sharp increase in caseloads in the early 1990s is 
poorly explained by either our annual or monthly data models suggests 
that the on-going rapid drop in caseloads in the mid to late 1990s is also 
likely to be largely unexplained by these models.
At best, the ongoing decline in unemployment rates can explain 
about 8 to 19 percent of the AFDC caseload declines since 1994 and 
about 28 to 44 percent of the food stamp caseload declines. Based on 
our best estimates from historical data, the expected effect of any 
future one-point increase in unemployment will be to increase TANF 
caseloads by 4 to 6 percent and food stamp caseloads by 6 to 7 percent. 
These estimates indicate that any future recession will surely raise 
caseloads, but is unlikely to bring them back to their mid 1990s level, 
all else equal.
This suggests that the recent caseload decline must be largely due 
to factors other than the strong economy. A minimal estimate of the 
affect of welfare reform is to forecast that welfare reform was the 
equivalent of implementing waivers in all states. Based on annual data, 
this approach indicates that welfare reform explains 8 percent (6 per 
cent) of the caseload decline in AFDC/TANF (food stamp) caseloads 
from 1994-98. In reality, however, many states have implemented 
TANF programs that were quite different and more extensive than 
waivers (most notably, TANF programs typically affect a larger share 
of the recipient population than did many waiver programs.) A maxi 
mal effect of welfare reform from 1996-98 is the unexplained decline 
in caseloads, along with any ongoing effects of state waivers. Using 
this estimate from monthly data, welfare reform can explain up to 75 
percent of the AFDC caseload decline and up to 85 percent of the food
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stamp caseload decline. Of course, these estimates ascribe all unex 
plained effects post-1996 to welfare reform and probably overestimate 
the effect.
The wide range between these minimum and maximum estimates 
indicates the need for further research to look more closely at behav 
ioral changes in take-up, as well as state-specific changes in eligibility 
that might be driving these dramatic changes in caseloads. These 
results are certainly consistent with a story whereby potential welfare 
recipients are strongly influenced by a host of less-measurable factors 
(including their own sense of the "acceptability" of utilizing public 
assistance) when deciding whether or not to participate in public assis 
tance.
The food stamp caseload has historically moved in very similar 
ways to the AFDC caseload. Given that many AFDC recipients also 
receive food stamps, the correlation in historical patterns of AFDC and 
foods stamp caseloads is not surprising. More surprising is the obser 
vation that food stamp caseloads appear to be influenced by political 
and program variables that should have no direct effects on the food 
stamp program but which do affect AFDC receipt. This tight historical 
correlation between food stamps and AFDC receipt raises major ques 
tions about the effect of current welfare reform on food stamp usage. It 
remains to be seen whether food stamp caseloads continue to fall along 
with TANF caseloads, or whether these two programs begin to diverge, 
as food stamp usage remains relatively high among low-wage working 
families even as many of these families leave TANF-funded services. 
Residual food stamps, those food stamps not received by AFDC/ 
TANF-eligible households, are more cyclical than overall food stamps 
and their levels appear to be better explained by economic and demo 
graphic variables than are overall food stamp caseloads.
From a research perspective, we are just beginning to acquire the 
data necessary to begin to understand the impact of the recent welfare 
reform. Future work on caseload changes might involve more detailed 
coding of state-specific program changes, allowing us to identify the 
effect of specific program interventions on caseload changes. As more 
data becomes available, the inclusion of a richer set of control variables 
in the post-1996 period will allow us to better separate out the impact 
of welfare reform from the impact of other changing political and 
demographic factors. Finally, as data on household income, labor
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force behavior, and family composition become available for the post- 
1996 period, this can be used to identify behavioral changes and differ 
entiate how much of the recent caseload decline is due to reductions in 
public assistance participation among eligibles as opposed to changes 
in eligibility.
Notes
Wallace received support from the office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services, for work on this paper. This 
paper reflects only the views of the authors
1. Many of these changes are still underway. The New Fiscal Federalism project of 
the Urban Institute indicates many of the state-specific changes on their Web site 
at <http.//newfederalism.urban.org>. Gais and Nathan (1999) provide a recent 
description of the nature of these state changes, while Blank (1997a) described 
these changes in a broader context.
2. Food stamp and TANF data are currently only available through June 1998. We 
use the average caseload in the first six months as the 1998 observation.
3. For instance, see Congressional Budget Office (1993) or Gabe (1992). Blank 
(1997b) included citations to a number of earlier studies.
4. Monthly cash benefits from AFDC were primarily available to single-parent fami 
lies (known as the AFDC-Basic program), but a small number of two-parent fam 
ilies also received AFDC (known as the AFDC-UP program, "UP" for 
unemployed parents). Blank (1997b) demonstrated that the AFDC-UP program 
caseloads have a very different set of determinants than the AFDC-Basic program, 
and that the program is much more responsive to cyclical indicators. In addition, 
the changes in AFDC-UP caseloads over the 1990s are more readily explained by 
available data than are the changes in AFDC-Basic.
5. The CEA (1997) study put a great deal of effort into coding the point at which 
major state waivers were approved, with the assistance of those within the Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services who approved the waivers. Blank (1997b) 
and Levine and Whitmore (1998) use this coding; Ziliak et al. (1998) used some 
what different coding.
6. Ziliak et al. reported the combined effect of the economic variables and their sea 
sonal factors; it would be interesting to know the effects of the cyclical variables 
alone. The present paper presents a comparison of monthly versus annual data 
estimates and finds little difference in results.
7. In 1996, the average annual cost of food stamps was $1072 per person, while 
average annual cost of AFDC per person was $1865 (U.S. House of Representa 
tives, 1998, Tables 7-11, 15-4, and 15-8). Both numbers include administrative 
costs as well as benefits paid. Historically, the Federal government has paid virtu 
ally all food stamp costs but split AFDC costs with the states through a matching
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grant formula. Under TANF, the Federal payment share is substantial, but it is 
fixed by the block grant amount.
8. In 1996, an estimated 61 percent of food stamp households did not receive AFDC 
benefits.
9. Surprisingly, although virtually all AFDC recipients are eligible for food stamps, 
not all choose to receive them. Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimated that among 
single mothers eligible for both AFDC and food stamps only 54 percent received 
assistance from both programs; 11 percent reported receiving AFDC but not food 
stamps. The remainder did not participate in the AFDC program, despite their 
estimated eligibility.
10. Some of these changes were reversed in 1998.
11. Recent anecdotal stories suggest that, at least in some cases, when families end 
their TANF services, they are not being given information or encouragement to 
remain on food stamps.
12. Data sources and more detailed descriptions of these variables are available in 
Blank (1997b).
13. This data is based on the Outgoing Rotation Group data from the Current Popula 
tion Survey, which provides a large enough sample to estimate annual numbers by 
state.
14. These waiver variables equal the share of the year they were in effect in the year 
in which they were approved and then equal 1 in all following years. In 1996, we 
turn "on" the waiver variable in September for all states, indicating the passage of 
the 1996 welfare reform act.
15. This is based on an annual calculation in the CPS. We actually calculate this 
number separately for New York, California, and the rest of the United States 
These two states have a large enough representation in the CPS to allow state-spe 
cific estimates.
16 The impact of unemployment on food stamp caseloads is even stronger if we use a 
sparser specification as in column 1.
17. Blank (1997b) also indicated that about 40 percent of the AFDC caseload increase 
between 1990 and 1994 is due to a rise in child-only cases, where children collect 
benefits but the adult caretaker is not eligible. She discussed this change at length. 
We do not focus on that issue here, largely because we want to compare aggregate 
AFDC and food stamp caseload trends.
18. In addition, we use projected population information for the total population. All 
other variables are maintained at the 1996 levels.
19. These estimates also provide further information on the claim in Ziliak et al. that 
the monthly panel data provides different answers than the annual panel data.
20. Once a waiver dummy variable is set to 1 within a state, it stays on for the remain 
der of the time period, even after the implementation of welfare reform. This 
allows states that received early waivers to show different caseload changes than 
states that did not and is consistent with the fact that the welfare reform legislation 
allowed states to continue their waiver programs.
88 Wallace and Blank
21. The monthly data from some states is not characterized by a strong trend. Exam 
ples of states where In(caseloads) looks to be stationary prior to differencing 
include Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
22. In the context of the distributed lag models in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the 
term "long run" refers to the length of the lag.
23. To see this, compare the coefficients on unemployment and waivers in Table 4 
with the sum of the three unemployment rate coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 2.
24. Note that the estimates in Table 3 for the monthly models are not entirely compa 
rable to the estimates from the annual data models. This inconsistency is due to 
fact that all of the calculations for the annual data are computed in terms of the log 
caseload share while the calculations using the monthly data are computed in 
terms of log caseloads. The other major difference is that the regressions used to 
generate the figures for the annual data are weighted by the state total population, 
while the regressions used to generate the monthly data are not weighted.
25 The annual data models actually predict a decrease in AFDC/TANF caseload 
share between 1990-94, largely because of changes in demographic factors, polit 
ical factors, and AFDC benefit levels.
26 In the context of the annual models, economic factors include unemployment 
rates, log median wages, and the log of the 20th percentile of wages, while in the 
monthly models the economic factors are the unemployment rates.
27. They estimate a autoregressive distributed lag model with three lags of the depen 
dent variable and six lags of the unemployment rate.
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